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INDEFENSE OF INTROSPECTION 
by 
ANTHONY QUINTON 
1. The traditional conception of inner sense. 
"All ideas", says Locke, "come from sensation and reflection". He defines reflec­
tion as 'the perception of the operations of our own minds within us' and goes on 
'though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very 
like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense'. As examples of the 
operations of which reflection 'takes notice' he mentions perception, thinking, 
doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing and willing, but comments shortly after­
ward: 'The term operations. here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely 
the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes 
from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from my thought'. (�2-
say Concerning Human Understanding, book II, chapter 1.) 
This view of one's awareness of one's own states of mind is taken over without 
comment by Berkeley. At the outset o f  the main text of ::fhe Principles of Human 
KnowledgEl, he says that as well as "ideas actually imprinted on the senses", there 
are ideas "such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations o f  the 
mind". Hume, likewise, divides impressions, and the ideas derived from them, into 
"those of sensation, and those o f  reflection", giving as instances of the latter 'pas­
sions, desires and emotions'. (Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 1,  section 2.) 
The faculty of reflection, renamed 'inner sense' in accordance with Locke's com­
parison, appears again in the philqsophy of Kant. It first emerges in the Aesthetic 
of the first Critique, where time, as 'the form of the internal sense, that is, of the 
institutions of self and of our internal state', is distinguished from space, which is 
'the form of all phenomena of the external sense'. 
This Lockean notion that there are two ultimate and distinct sources of empiri­
cal knowledge was a standard assumption· of theorists of knowledge in the earlier 
part of the present century. In the epistemological writings of Russell, Moore, 
Broad and Price the distinction is expressed as that between sensation and introspec­
tion. But since the doubts, inspired by Wittgenstein, about the power of the argu­
ment from analogy to solve the problem of other minds first became widespread 
among theorists of knowledge, the notion of introspection has fallen into disfavour. 
In certain quarters, however, the conviction persists that we do have direct know­
ledge or awareness of our own states of mind, that we do not have to observe our 
own speech and behavior 'in order to find out whether we are angry or elated or 
what we believe or hope or fear, and that, furthermore, we do often come to know, 
or at least reasonably to believe, such things about ourselves. It is my purpose here 
to defend this conviction. 
2. Some verbal preliminaries. 
There are good reasons for the dropping of thie word 'reflection' as the stamdard 
term for referring to the capacity in question. The principal one is that in current 
speech the word is almost exclusively appropriated to thinking, as against any form 
of observation. One who reflects does,. like one who turns his attention to his own 
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piesent state of consciousness, withdraw his attention from the perceptible circum· 
stances that surround him. 'Let me reflect' is a request to be spared from conversa­
tional intrusion for a while so that attention may be better directed elsewhere. Now 
often what one is reflecting about is rather whether one wants .to follow some pro­
posed course of action, which might seem to be a matter of careful observation of 
the state of one's own desires, than whether one can follow it. But, in such a case, 
what is happening is that one is reasoning out what the costs and consequences of 
the proposal will be and not simply looking to see whether it  is, as it stands, an 
attractive one or not. 
Our current understanding of reflection as ratiocination rather than self-observa· 
tion is not, perhalli, all that new. Leibniz, after all, took Locke to have acknowledg­
ed innate ideas by admitting that it is a source of knowledge coordinate with sensa­
tion. 
Another, lesser, objection to the term for the purpose in hand is the suggestions 
it carries, although it does not entail them, of passivity and infallibility. Although 
much of our knowledge of, or belief about, our own mental states just comes to us 
unsought, even intrudes itself upon us, we can deliberately seek out such knowledge 
or belief. In this domain of interest we can be searchlights as well as mirrors. As for 
infallibility, although mirrors can be flawed or otherwise defective, the concept of 
a mirror-image is something of a paradigm for accuracy of registration. 
If 'reflection' is too passive a word, its twentieth-century successor 'introspec­
tion' suffers to some extent from the opposite defect. To introspect is to seek in an 
attentive and purposive way, in ordinary, non-philosophical speech: An introspec­
tive person is not one who has a mass of detailed knowledge about his own states of 
mind so much as one who SJPends a lot of time seeking to acquire such knowledge. 
Similarly, a hero of introspection like Henry James is not so much endowed with 
the inner-directed analogue of very powerful eyesight as a dedicated investigator of 
the minute and precise detail of the stream of thought and feeling. 
There are other candidates for the post. One is 'self-consciousness', sometimes 
preferred to 'introspection' just because of its freedom from any connection with 
the purposive direction of attention. But, as Ryle has noticed, it has another defect. 
A self-consci,ous person is one who is morbidly, or at least to an abnormally lavish 
extent, preoccupied with what he is doing or looks like and with the effect that his 
actions and appearances are likely to have. As for 'self-knowledge' and the dOOely 
related 'self-awareness', they, even more than 'reflection', carry an implication of 
infallibility. That, lt might be argued, need not be a disadvantage. We are perfectly 
aware that our memories are unreliable and incomplete, even though it is impossible 
to remember what has not actually happened. 
In the circumstances, since all the obvious candidates have their faults and no 
new coinage suggests itself, i t  seems best to stick to 'introspection'. It is familiar in 
this employment, its defects are much less radical than those of 'reflection' and it  
has the stylistic merit of having a convenient adjectival form. To have noticed its 
possibly misleading implications should be sufficient protection against actually be­
ing misled. 
3. The essentials of introspection. 
What is involved in the claim that we have a power of introspection? The daim 
i5 that we have a capacity t.o acquire knowledge or form beliefs about our own states 
of mind which is analogous to ordinary sense-perception, but nevertheless distinct 
from it. 
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The crucial respect in which there is taken to be an analogy between outer and 
inner perception is that both are direct sources of knowledge or belief, in the sense 
that they are non-inferential. What that must mean here is not simply that as a mat­
ter of fact be1iefs about one,s own current states of mind do not ordinarily arise as 
the outcome of a process of inference, although it is, no doubt, broadly true. The 
point is that some beliefs about the minds of others may in fact be non-inferential 
in that way, even if most are not, so that on such an interpretation non-inferential­
ity would be a matter of degree and, as varying from person to person, would not 
be a property of the contents of belief as such, but only of them relative to par­
ticular believers. 
What must be understood by non-inferentiality in this connection is that it is 
possessed by a belief which does not depend wholly on inference from other beliefs 
for its justificafion. The more familiar notion of the basic proposition is usually 
taken to be defined by a certain kind of non-inferentiality, namely of not needing 
support from other beliefs or propositions in order to be known for certain to be 
true. Another way of putting this would be to say that a proposition is basic in this 
strong sense if it can be justified conclusively without reliance on other beliefs. 
There is clearly a difference between the two kinds of non-inferentiality , partial 
and complete, just mentioned. But usually those who have suppaied, as there is good 
reason to do, that there must be some beliefs which do not depend on other beliefs 
for their justification, have assumed that they must all be of the completely non­
inferential, or incorrigible, kind. But the circularity of a coherence theory of know­
ledge or justified belief can be avoided without assuming completely non-inferential 
foundations. 
This respect of analogy is of a fairly abstract or formal nature. Another, �o gen­
eral and obvious as to seem barely worth stating, is that the be1iefs provided by 
sense-perception and introspection are singular, empirical and current in the sense 
of concerning what is the case at the time they are formed. That they are current 
distinguishes them from memory.beliefs, which presuppose, but are, of course, not 
inferred from, previous beliefs of perception or introspection. That they are singular 
and empirical distinguishes them from non-inferential truths of a conceptual or 
analytic nature. 
It may be thought that the analogy does not stretch very far. For one thing there 
is no parallel in introspection to the sense-organs that are characteristic of percep­
tion. Certainly we rely on clearly identifiable and familiar sense-organs - eyes, ears, 
nose, tongue, fingers · for the bulk of our perceptual beliefs. Furthermore the mani­
pulation of these organs is a skill we acquire which makes it  possible to gain much 
more information about our physical surroundings that we should have if we were 
�ively confined to what simply thrust itself on us. The manipulability of our 
sense-organs is crucial for exploratory perception. 
But there is one field of perceptual knowledge where clearly identifiable sense­
organs are not employed: our perceptions of the states and positions of our bodies 
and their parts. How do I know that there is a fish-bone in my throat before I look 
in the mirror or pull it out and examine it with my eye? How do I know, without 
looking, that my left leg is crossed over my right leg; that I have twisted my head 
round to look over my right shoulder when I am up to neck in some opaque med­
ium; that there is a stone or something of that sort in my shoe? These cases of 
bodily perception, although inner to the extent that they are concerned with what 
is in, on, or directly in contact with the body, are still cases of perception, instances 
of those extended uses of the sense of touch called muscular or kinaesthetic per­
ception. 
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This variety of uninferred knowledge that we have about our own bodies has 
sometimes been called 'knowledge without observation', a piece of needless mysti­
fication. It is, undoubtedly, knowledge without visiolb of something which is usu­
ally in principle visible, but, although philosophers of perception often write as if 
it were, sight is not our only sense. There is no great obscurity about the machinery 
of bodily perception. To start with the whole surface of the body is tactually sensi­
tive, even if to varying degrees and generally much less than the paragons of touch-­
the finger tips. This tactual sensitivity is not confined to the body's surface, as we 
all know from visits to the dentist, but substantial regions of the body are largely 
devoid of it. 
D.M. Armstrong has made the very important observation that perception of our 
own bodies is above all crucial if we are to engage in purposive bodily behavior. If 
we are consciously and deliberately to control what we are doing, we must have a 
continuous flow of perceptual information about the bodily parts involved in our 
programme of action. The role of tactual, but non-digital, perception of our own 
bodies in this becomes clear when one tries to do something with a limb that has 
gone to sleep, guiding it simply by eye, such as undressing or opening a letter. 
In bodily perception, then, there is no determinate sense-organ, but there is a 
diffused network of sensitive surfaces which is the causally necessary mediator of 
the perce,ptual information involved. Is there anything of this kind in the introspec· 
tive am to enlarge the analogy under consideration'? Armstrong advances the purely 
speculative hypothesis of a self-scanning device in the brain, by means of which one 
part of it responds to and takes account of what is going on in other parts of it. That 
seems a reasonable conjecture but it is an imaginative extension of the other analo­
gies between perception and introspection and not the discovery of a further like­
ness. However, it draws attention to an interesting point. The objects and events of 
which ordinary perception takes note are more or less remote from the body, some­
times very far away from jt indeed. Thus there is an obvious and inescapable gap 
between the perceiver, physically conceived, and the perceived. In bodily percep­
tion of the tactual but non-digital kind the organ proper, the sensitive extremity, 
is at or near the surface of the body, in much the same place as the limbs or move­
ments it perceives. It is surely the most plausible view of introspection that it con­
sists in some transaction with events in or states of the brain, whether these are 
conceived as literally identical with mental states, as in the identity theory or cen­
tral-state materialism, or as their causal correlates. In that case, as is acauned in Arm­
strong's speculation, both the introspective perceiving and the introspectively per­
ceived will be inside the brain and thus both practically inaccessible to all but the 
most indirect perceptual investigation and also very small. It is thus not su rprisng 
that whatever the organ-like machinery of introspection may be, we should not 
have any straightforward common knowledge of it, as we have in abundance about 
our sense-organs proper and, in a less definite form, about our tactually sensitive 
surfaces as crucial to bodily perception. 
It has been maintained by Geach that there is a defect of analogy between per­
ception and introspection which shows them not to be coordinate at all, namely 
that there are no such things as introspective images. That is a very curious conten­
tion. One does not have to identify recollection with the having of images, to admit 
that imagery is very often the vehicle or, at any rate, the accompaniment of recol­
lection. But one can as vividly recollect one's embarrassment as one can the visible 
state of affairs that was its occasion. Armstrong mentions the emotions one feels at 
a play as a further example of introspective imagery. What goes on when one inter­
estedly looks over an old diary could be added. 
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Introspection is, then, like perception in being a non-inferentially justified souree 
of singular, empirical beliefs about what is currently the case. If it does not ob­
viously rely on organs in the way perception of what is external to the body does, 
bodily perception relies on sense-organs only in an attenuated way and the most 
plausible general view of the machinery of introspection implies that, if there is 
something. that serves it as an organ, we should not be straightforwardly aware of it. 
Images are associated with both types of awareness. 
4 . The distinction of introspection and Eerception. 
Let us turn to the distinction between the two. From a commonsensical point 
of view the basis of a distinction is plain enough: it lies in the nature of their objects. 
Perception has as its objects physical states of affairs acting on the perceiver; intro­
spection has as its objects mental states of affairs going on in the mind of the intro­
spector. 
For most philosophers until rather recent times, this way of distinguishing the 
two is not available. The reason is, of course, that for most philosophers physical 
things are not the true objects of perception, but are inferred or constructed en­
tities, somehow derived from the private impressions or sense-data which are the 
true and direct objects of percept�on. On the sense-datum theory, indeed, percep­
tion, properly understood, is not coordinate with introspection. It is, rather, a �­
kl� of introspection, namely the non-inferential awareness of a particular, sensory 
variety of one's own states of mind. 
That would not, as it stands, be fatal to the view that there is a distinction be­
tween the two. A species is not the same as the genus of which it is a species; it is 
also distinct in the fullest possible way from the other species of the genus in which 
it is contained. 
But how, on this traditional view, are perceptual experience and the non-percep­
tual experience, which is the object of introspection proper, to be distinguished? 
It will not do to say that an experience is perceptual if it serves as a basis for infer­
ence to a conclusion about the physical. Pain, after all, is offered as the paradigm of 
introspection, yet we commonly form beliefs about the nature of the causes of pain 
from the felt character of the pains they cause us. What is odd about putting pain 
on the introspective side of the distinction is that it is the most interesting kind of 
bodily sensatiof!. Yet sensation is taken to be the empirical core of perception. 
Another possible criterion to distinguish the perceptual would be its spatial char­
acter. But to this, again, it could be objected that pain is experienced as located. 
Locke, it should be recalled, classed pleasure and pain as ideas of both sensation and 
reflection; of sensation when they were physical and localised in some part of the 
body, of reflection when they were not. But even if spatialicy is a sufficient condi­
tion of the perceptual, it does not appear to be a necessacy condition. We surely 
perceive smells, sounds and tastes; but we do not perceive them as spatial, although 
we perceive features of them, in particular intensity, which enable us to locate them, 
by way of their causes or the organs we perceive them with, in the space of sight 
and touch. 
Since I do not accept the sense-datum theory of perception I am not really con­
cerned with the problem of how one who does is to distinguish perception from 
introspection. I take the direct objects of perception to be public, material things, 
capable of existing unperceived and, for the most part, accessible on the same terms 
to different perceivers. I say 'for the most part' since there is a certain asymmetry 
of access with regard to bodily perception. A person has a way of finding out what 
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is going on in his body which others do not have, what might be called the inwardly 
tactual, muscular and kinaesthetic, perception that he has of its state, position and 
movement. This gives him additional evidence, over and above the visual percep­
tions, or externally tactual ones, that he shares with others. But it is evidence of the 
same sort as is supplied by vision and externaJ touch and can be overridden by it 
and needs to be confirmed by it. 
But if a central state materialist theory of the nature of mental entities is com­
bined with a direct realist theory of perception the problem of distinction breaks 
out again at a new level. For the sense-datum theorist who holds a Cartesian theory 
of mind, perception gets absorbed into introspection. For the direct realist who 
accepts the identity theory of mind, introspection appears to be absorbed into per­
ception, since the objects of introspection, states of the brain, turn out to be 
physical. 
On either conbination of Views the correct conclusion to draw is that perhaps 
there i5 no hard-and-fast distinction between outer and inner perception. Those who 
hold the two mentalist theories can say that introspection is non-inferential empiri­
cal awareness at that end of the continuum of such awareness where the beliefs 
acquired are not used as premises of inferences to an external ·world. Those who 
hold the two physiaiist theories will locate the introspective at that end of the con­
tinuum of non-inferential empirical awareness where the belief acquired is minimal­
ly informative about the spatial character of the state of affairs it reports, locating 
it neither in the external world, in the literal sense of the world beyond the perceiv­
er's body, nor at some particular place in his body, but, if anywhere, as roughly 
where his body is. 
After all, what is really at issue is the likeness and not the distinctness of our 
access to common material objects and our own states of mind. The closer the 
likeness, the shallower the distinction. The shallower the distinction the mo re 
forcibly the directly empiricaJ nature of our consciousness of our own mental life is 
affinned. 
Before leaving the subject, however, one further proposal for distinguishing the 
two kinds of perception should be considered. It could be held that the natural re­
gistration of a belief acquired by sense-perception does not mention onself (thus, 
'there is a dead cat here'), while that of an introspective belief does (thus, 'I feel 
depressed' or, of course, 'I see a dead cat', which reports the introspective perceiv· 
ing of a sense-perception and only derivatively the sense-perception itself). Here 
again what seems at first sight an attractive proposal, and all the more so for pre­
supposing no formed views about the nature of the objects of the two kinds of per­
ception, runs into difficulties with bodily perception. 
For the most part, no doubt, bodily perception is reported not by talking about 
oneself, as a whole, but with the mention of some part of the body: 'my left arm is 
behind my back', 'my head is turned to the right', 'my foot has something digging 
into it'. But the last of those beliefs could be reexpressed as 'I have something dig. 
ing into my foot'. We also say such things as 'I have a fishbone stuck in my throat' 
and again 'I am stuck in this narrow gap'. It may be that introspection proper can 
be separated from bodily perception in accordance with this proposal if it is amend­
ed to require that the mention of oneself that is a criterion of introspectiveness 
should not be replacable by a reference to one's body as a whole or to some part of 
it. The equivalence of the two self-mentioning reports of bodily perception to 'my 
throat has a fish-bone stuck in it' and 'my body is stuck in this narrow gap' (admitt­
edly not a very natural remark) marks them off from 'I feel depressed' or 'I wish it 
was Saturday' from which the first personal pronoun is ineliminable. 'There is a 
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feeling of depression', for example, is simply incomplete, inviting the question 
'whose is it?' 
This proposal confirms the propriety of calling introspection self-consciousness 
or self-knowledge. That way of speaking is sometimes objected to as implying that 
introspection always is, or at least contains as an essential part, an awareness of the 
self as something distinct from its states. In fact it does nothing of the sort. What 
Hume's fruitless introspective self-exploration showed was not that he had no im· 
pression of the self, but that he had no .§imple impression of the self. From that, on 
his principles, it follows that he can have no simple idea of himself, but that leaves 
his possession of a complex idea of himself entirely open. 
The upshot of this discussion is that the traditional idea that the nature of the 
distinction between sense-perception and introspection is so obvious and straight· 
forward as not to need examination is mistaken. H is particularly open to objection 
when this is assumed by philosophers who hold that the true and direct objects of 
sense-perception are sense-data, conceived as Berkeleyan, mind-dependent emences. 
But the difficulty of drawing a clear and explicit distinction, emphasized by the pro­
blem of accomodating the perceptions we have of our own bodies to it, does not 
undermine the main claim of the defender of introspection. That is that we have 
a non-inferential empirical awareness of particular facts about the current states 
of our own minds, even if  these states are also states of our brains, and that this 
awareness does not depend on our ordinary sense-organs or on the diffused sensi-
. tivity which we conceive as an extension of our sense of touch. 
5. Incorrigibility and self-intimation. 
To accept introspection in the sense just defined is not to accept the idea that 
our awareness of our own states of mind is infallible, as the Cartesian tradition (one 
might even call it Augustinian tradition) supposes. 
In the first place, our current states of mind are not universally self-intimating, 
are not, that is to say, such that they cannot occur unless we are aware of them. 
There is a familiar formal argument for that conclusion. If I see a tree an event of 
sense-perception occurs in my mind. If, as is no doubt usually the cas·e in such cir­
cumstances, I am introspectively aware of my perceiving the true, another, intro­
spective, even_t occurs. It is the possible object of a further introspective occurrence. 
If I mu.s_!; be aware of everything that occurs in my mind each such event must gen­
erate an infinite series of awareness. 
There are three ways in which this argument can be circumvented. One is to deny 
the distinction between the mental occurence and the awareness of it. This is, in 
effect, the position of Locke, who says that the soul 'must necessarily be conscious 
of its own perceptions' and! that 'to suppose the soul to think, and the man not to 
perceive it is ... to make two persons in one man'. A second is to restrict self-intima­
tion to those elementary mental states that do not have mental states as their ob­
jects, in other words to say that all mental states are self-intimating except states of 
introspecting. A third is simply to reject the assumption that any mental states are 
self -intimating. 
To many it seems simply self-evident, as against the Lockean proposal, that an 
object or state of affairs and the awareness of it cannot be one and the same. It is 
more effective, however, to draw attention to the fact that we have very good·rea­
son to suppose that there are many mental states whose possessors are unconscious 
of them. Our behaviour can show, in a way that we can subsequently be induced 
reasonably to accept, that we have perceived something or been in some emotional 
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state or held some belief without being aware of the fact at the time it obtained. In 
that case both the first two responses are ruled out. 
The other aspect of the infallibility traditionally ascribed to introspection is in· 
corrigibility, the theory being that it follows from my believing something intro­
spectively that it is true. This is different from self-intimation. To reject self-intima­
tion is to allow that one can fail to have a belief about some mental state of one's own. 
To reject incorrigibility is to allow that one can have a false belief about a current 
mental state. Having no belief is not the same as having a false belief but one can 
easily lead to the other. If I do not believe I am jealous of someone, when I actually 
am, I shall form and express the belief that I am not jealous of him when I am asked 
if I am. 
The problem about the thesis that introspection is incorrigible is to understand 
how it evet came to be believed. It is quite obvious that we do very often have false 
beliefs about our own mental states. The Socratic injunction, know thyself, is not a 
superfluity; it calls one to a difficult task. As far as character-traits are concerned, 
for example, their possessor is commonly far less well-informed about them than 
his intimates are. 
What perhaps initiated this curious conception of the incorrigibility of our intro­
spective beliefs is the Cartesian error of supposing that the epistemic peculiarities 
of 'I think' are possessed by all first-person reports of states of consciousness. By 
'I think' Descartes meant 'I am conscious', in other words 'I am conscious of some­
thing or in some way or other'. That indeterminate assertion is self-verifying, in the 
sense that it being true is a logically necessary condition of its being asserted. The 
property of being self-verifying does not carry over to its specific, determinate 
forms. It does not follow from the fact that I say, state or assert that I am elated or 
embarrassed that I am. In general, self-verifyingnes.s is a property of trivial assertions, 
such as that I am here, it is now, I am saying something. It is impossible to deceive 
someone with such an assertion, but one can easily deceive someone into believing 
that one is elated or embarrassed. Descartes' mistake was the result of his vague and 
unilluminating account of the distinguishing property of 'cogito' as that of being 
clear and distinct. 
Self-verifyingness, being true if asserted, is one kind of incorrigibility; but there 
is another, that of being true if believed. It is widely supposed that that this is 
characteristic, either of all first-person reports of mental states, or at least of some 
fundamental class of such reports, the paradigm of which is 'I am in pain'. There is 
a strong case for the incorrigibility of the parad igm, although I do not think it is 
conclusive. Much of its strength comes from the indeterminacy of the claim. In 
saying such a thing we say only part of what we believe, which· will be something 
more like 'I have a dull pain in my left knee'. But that can be interpreted so as to be 
compatible with one's not having a left knee. 
Are reports of one's beliefs, emotions, desires and attitudes incorrigible in this 
way? The fact that they are not very often challenged should not be confused with 
the fact, if it is a fact, that they ate usually true. We do, surely, often accept correc­
tion from others as to what we believe and feel. Whether we do or not, those who 
do not believe what we say about our beliefs and feelings do not have to suppose 
that we are saying what we know or believe to be false. But if such beliefs are true 
if believed they would have to make that supposition. 
On the other hand it should be acknowledged that the possibility of false beliefs 
about current mental states does not by itself prove the corrigibility of introspec­
tion. For it may well be that many states are not directly introspectible. H.H. Price 
suggests this when he says, 'the contents of our own minds, or at least those con-
84 
9
Quinton: In Defense of Introspection
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1977
ANTHONY QUINTON 
tents which are in any sense directly introspectible, are brief events rather than per­
sisting entities'. (Belief, p. 61) Yet a few lines later he talks of a leaden feeling of de­
pression lasting all through the day as introspectible. Returning to the topic later in 
the book, he asks what his evidence is for believing that he �s a· timid person. 'My 
evidence' he goes on, 'is not just some other proposition which I believe. It is some· 
thing I have noticed about myself. I have noticed on a great many occasions that I 
am easily frightened by persons, objects and situations which do not seem to fright­
en others at all'. (Belief, p. 104-5) He concludes, 'My evidence for believing that I 
am a timid person is the evidence of self-consciousness, the frequent expnienres of 
fear which I have noticed in myself on many different sorts of occasions.' 
Price's entirely realistic account of how he has come to believe he is a timid per· 
son makes it quite clear that his timidity is not �omething directly introspected by 
him. His evidence for it is other propositions which he believes. Some of these may 
be direct reports of introspection, those, namely, in which his feeling fear on various 
occasions are reported. But others are not: those, namely, in which the public cir­
cumstances of his feelings of fear are described and those reporting.the fear of oth· 
ers and describing the circumstances in which it was felt. To believe that one is 
timid is doubly complex, one could say. In the first place it is dispositional; it asserts 
a persisting tendency or liability to feel fear in circumstances of various kinds. Se­
condly, it is comparative; it asserts that one's own tendency to feel fear is above 
average. On this account of the matter, introspection comes in only to discover the 
occurrent feelings of fear of one's own which are a rather small, if essential, part of 
the evidence required. 
Now Price is a defender of introspection and one of the m ost thorough , careful 
and penetrating theorists of knowledge of this century. It is, therefore, strange that 
he should write so loosely about introspection. That he should do so is a symptom 
fo a widespread reluctance to examine it directly. Broad devotes a substantial chap· 
ter of The Mind and Its Place in Nature to the topic and concludes that introspec­
tion is neither infallible nor exhaustive. But his treatment of it is unsystematic and 
partial. Much of his attention is devoted to the question of whether we introspect a 
self distinct from mental states and when he considers the introspection of mental 
states he is principally concerned with mental states of a perceptual kind. In general, 
the philosophical defenders of introspection never give it the kind of attention they 
give to sense-perception. If  they had they would no more have regarded timidity as 
directly introspectible than they would regard solubility or expensiveness as directly 
perceptible. More recently, of course, introspection has bee,n denied altogether. 
Before going on to examine that denial this stage of the discussion may be con· 
eluded with the remark that, although introspection is neither exhaustive nor inf all· 
ible, its fallibility has to be established by the relevant kind of case, those involving 
occurrent mental states, and not by consideration of beliefs about our own mental 
states which are clearly inferential, both as a matter of fact and as regards their 
justification. 
6. The attack on introspection. 
What has incited hostililty to the idea of introspection has been the belief that 
knowledge about minds and mental states other than one's own cannot be justified 
by analogical argument. The first response to this conclusion was to suppose that 
while one's knowledge of one's own mind was introspective, the only knowledge 
others could have of one's mind was of the dispositions to behave in certain ·ways 
in which the inner states one introspected were in fact associated. But this position 
85 
10
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 8 [1977], No. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol8/iss1/6
IN DEFENSE OF INTROSPECTION 
had the consequence that 'I am angry' said by me at a given moment and 'you are 
not angry' said to me at the same moment are logically independent and could both 
be true, a consequence properly regarded as absurd. 
The next step, which may be called Rylean, although Ryle took it with puzzling 
reservations, amongst them the reasonable thesis that introspection is retrospection, 
was to hold that all statements about mental states, in the first person as well as 
others, are really statements about dispositions to behaviour. Ryle's central claim, 
one which in effect denies, introspection, is that we know about ourselves in the 
same sort of way and on the same sort of evidence as others do. What he says is 
wholly true about long-term traits of character and has some bearing on (though 
one can hardly say: is partly true of) such mental states as belief and desire. But it 
is plainly and simply false of such mental events as bodily sensations, though ts pre­
sent in one's consciousness, sudden onsets of emotion or desire. Ryle's readiness to 
talk about introspection as a reality is not necessarily at odds with the comprehen­
sive behaviourism of his central doctrine. He may, in his references to introspection, 
be using it in a sense tailored to his general theory, that is as meaning whatever 
produces or justifies beliefs, about one's own mental states and that, on his general 
theory, is perception of one's circumstances and behaviour together with inference 
therefrom. 
But he does also talk of avowals, first-person reports of mental states in which 
we disclose (to ourselves as well as others, it seems) that we are in the mental states 
in question. This is an idios,yncratic version of a doctrine about pain-statements put 
forward by Wittgenstein, which seems to have been intended, and has widely been 
taken, to be applicable to many first-person reports (although it is hard to find out 
which ones it is limited to). There are two features of Wittgenstein's view that are 
particularly relevant to the theory that introspection is the ultimate source of know­
ledge of oneself, in that they make that theory out to be answer to an improper 
question. The first is that the utterance 'I am in pain' is not really a statement but 
a variant or extension of natural pain-behaviour, in other words a kind of cry, but of 
a conventionalised kind, like 'ouch'. The second is that since there is no sense to 
the statement 'I think I am in pain but I am not sure' there is no sense to the state­
ment 'I know I am in pain'. The upshot is that since my pains are not objects of 
knowledge for me there is no need to hunt for a way of knowing them. 
The first of these two contentions is not wholly gratuitous. If I say 'I believe the 
next train is at 6:30' I am not so much reporting the fact about my current mental 
life that such a belief is part of it, as expressing the belief in a slightly diluted or 
qualified way. Likewise if I say 'I want that one, please' I am rather making a request 
than reporting the current state of my desires. 'I don't think you do' is an inapprop­
riate, or at any rate jocular and oblique, response to it, as is 'are you sure that's what 
you believe' is to the remark about the 6: 30 train. In Urmson's useful phrase the 
occurrence of 'believe' and 'want' in these utterances is l!_arenthE'tical. But their 
parenthetical use is dependent on their having a direct, non-parenthetical use. It 
also requires something for them to parenthesise: a proposition in one case, an ob­
ject of desire in the other. Neither condition is satisfied in the case of 'I am in pain'. 
The second is an instance of a recently common philosophical fallacy which in­
fers the senselessness of a mode or form of speech from its inappropriateness. Thus 
one should not say 'I believe it is the 25th' when one knows it is because that form 
of words suggests that one does not know: but if one knows it is the 25th one does 
believe it all the same. 'I know I am in pain', particularly if there is an emphasis on 
the 'know', suggests that there is some doubt about it that has been expressed or 
implied. But even if it is wrong to say it, in the absence of such doubt, it is still true. 
These slightly bizarre attempts to deny that we are aware of our own mental 
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states in a special, proprietary way have somewhat lost their appeal. But that has 
not led to the revival of the idea of introspection. Instead we hear about �elf-ascri..Q· 
tion. which is the linguistic or assertive outcome of introspection, but not of the 
cognitive occurrence which underlies it and justifies it. This theoretical taciturnity 
is sometimes defended on the ground that the knowledge embodied in self-ascrip­
tion is a kind of knowledge 'without criteria'. That is true to the extent that intro­
spection is non-inferential, but that does not mean it is without grounds, only that 
the grounds do not take the form of independently entertained and specifiable be­
liefs. The grounds of self-ascription can still be investigated and described. 
7.  Towards a phenomenology of introspection. 
'Belief', Russell said, 'is the most mental thing that we do'. It is certainly much 
more pervasive in our mental life than at first appears. To start with, a good many 
emotions involve belief·s about their objects, and as essential elements not just as 
causes. Fear, for instance, is, in part, the belief th.at something will harm one. Anger 
seems less closely connected to the be1ief that its object has harmed one at first 
glance, yet it is not enough to define anger as the desire to harm someone or some­
thing for such a desire would be purely malicious if it were not inspired by the belief 
that the harm desired was a reciprocation. . 
At any rate, belief would seem to be a reasonable starting-point among introspec­
tible states. How do we find out what we believe? If someone, including myself, 
puts the question of whether I believe something to me, I then ask myself what I 
would say. If the question is 'do you believe that p', I imagine what I should say if 
someone asked me 'is it the case that p'. There is a likeness here to, but also a differ­
ence from, Ryle's account of avowals as 'disclosures by unstudied talk'. It is not 
that I find out what I believe from hearing what I actually do say, as he suggests, 
but that I find out by consideril)g what I should say. 
Most accounts of introspection, even wholly sympathetic ones, are very uninfor­
mative about its workings. In the case of belief, they seem to suggest, one just looks 
inwards, finds a proposition floating through one's consciousness, attended with 
some slightly more convincing-looking substitute for Hume's vivacity, a 'belief-feel­
ing'. That, of course, raises the question pertinently put by Wittgenstein: how do 
you know that the feeling is a belief-feeling? 
Similar imaginative envisagements of possible or likely action take place when 
one looks into one's desires and emotions. Do I want a cup of coffee? Well, would 
I briskly cross the room and pick up a cup if one suddenly appeared there? Am I 
angry with Mr. Jones? Well, !how would I speak to him if I were suddenly alone with 
him? 
In the central-state materialism of Armstrong although mental states are not 
identified with the disposition to manifest them in overt behaviour, a close relation 
is asserted between state and disposition: the state of a person which is apt to cause 
the manifesting behaviour. If that is correct, it is not surprising that to discover 
whether one is in such a state one tries to find out whether one would, in ideal 
circumstances� do what, if in such a state, one is likely to do. 
I do not suggest that such a pattern is present in the case of pain, that in order 
to find out whether one is in pain, one has to think whether one would, if nobody 
was present to despise one's feebleness, cry out. In general, one does not need to 
find out that one is in pain, it is thrust upon one. Nor does the pattern apply to 
fmagery, which of all mental items is most loosely attached to manifesting behaviour. 
To report one's imagery is, surely. what it has always been thought to be by the old 
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empiricists who regarded so much of our mental life as the having of images, namely 
a kind of surr<>gate report of perception. 
It is important to mention here, since the account I have given of introspection 
as the imaginative envisagement of probable behavior might seem the prelude to an 
account of introspection as the contemplation and description of images. It is not 
intended to be such a prelude; but, it may be asked, if it is not then what does the 
kind of imaginative exercise I have mentioned actually amount to? I would suggest 
that what follows putting to oneself a question is not an auditory image of one's 
own voice answering it, as if one were listening to a recording of oneself, but the 
incipient stages of the process of actually giving the answer. One knows what it is 
to say 'it is raining' in the ordinary way where one means what one says. In so far 
as hearing oneself utter the words is a part of what one knows at all, it is at most a 
very small part. Now before one has actually uttered anything one knows what one 
is about to say in most cases, though a lot of what we say is, no doubt, habitual, 
automatic and so unconsidered. What shows this is the fact that, after an interrup­
tion at the outset of a remark, one can without difficulty say what it was one was 
going to have said if one had not been interrupted. To speak deliberately is to have 
a plan of speech. I suggest that we find out what we believe by imaginatively assem­
bling the conditions for the formation of such a plan, from which, as in the case of 
interruption, we can tell what it is we would say and thus do believe. I suggest fur­
ther that plans of non-verbal conduct serve us in an analogous fashion when we 
introspect mental states other than beliefs, many of which, however, involve beliefs 
with some degree of logical intimacy. 
What I have produced in this section is the barest sketch, but it is something that 
any theory of introspection has to supply if it is not to hide uncomm!.lnicatively 
behind the concept of self-ascription, which talks cheerfully about an arrival 'but 
has nothing to say about the journey, or, on the other hand, to represent introspec· 
tion in the style of the old imagist account with its helpless dependence on feelings 
whose specifically representative qualities, as feelings of belief or anger or elation, 
are left wholly unexplained and, indeed, unexplainable. 
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